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Abstract
The mismatch negativity (MMN) is an event related potential evoked by violations of regularity. Here, we present a model of
the underlying neuronal dynamics based upon the idea that auditory cortex continuously updates a generative model to
predict its sensory inputs. The MMN is then modelled as the superposition of the electric fields evoked by neuronal activity
reporting prediction errors. The process by which auditory cortex generates predictions and resolves prediction errors was
simulated using generalised (Bayesian) filtering – a biologically plausible scheme for probabilistic inference on the hidden
states of hierarchical dynamical models. The resulting scheme generates realistic MMN waveforms, explains the qualitative
effects of deviant probability and magnitude on the MMN – in terms of latency and amplitude – and makes quantitative
predictions about the interactions between deviant probability and magnitude. This work advances a formal understanding
of the MMN and – more generally – illustrates the potential for developing computationally informed dynamic causal
models of empirical electromagnetic responses.
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Introduction
Recent advances in computational neuroimaging [1] have
enabled inferences about the neurophysiological mechanisms that
generate non-invasive measures of task or stimulus-evoked
neuronal responses; as measured by functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging (fMRI) or electroencephalography (EEG). One
such approach is dynamic causal modelling [2] that tries to explain
EEG data in terms of synaptic coupling within a network of
interacting neuronal populations or sources. However, this
description is at the level of physiological processes that do not
have a direct interpretation in terms of information processing.
Cognitive scientists have been using formal models of cognitive
processes to infer on information processing from behaviour for
decades [3], but it has remained largely unclear how such
inferences should be informed by neurophysiological data. We
argue that one may overcome the limitations of both approaches
by integrating normative models of information processing (e.g.,
[4,5]) with physiologically grounded models of neuroimaging data
[4,5]. This approach may produce computationally informed
neuronal models – or neurocomputational models – enabling one
to test hypotheses about how the brain processes information to
generate adaptive behaviour. Here, we provide a proof-of-concept
for this approach by jointly modelling a cognitive process –
perceptual inference – and the event related potential (ERP) that it
may generate – the mismatch negativity (MMN). Specifically, we
ask whether the MMN can be modelled by a neuronal system
performing perceptual inference, as prescribed by predictive
coding [4,5].
The MMN is an event-related potential that is evoked by the
violation of a regular stream of sensory events. By convention, the
MMN is estimated by subtracting the ERP elicited by standards, i.e.
events that established the regularity, from the ERP elicited by
deviants, i.e. events violating this regularity. Depending on the
specific type of regularity, the MMN is usually expressed most
strongly at fronto-central electrodes, with a peak latency between
100 and 250 milliseconds after deviant onset [1]. More precisely,
the MMN has been shown to depend upon deviant probability
and magnitude. Deviant probability is the relative frequency of
tones that violate an established regularity. In studies of the MMN
evoked by changes in sound frequency, deviance magnitude is the
(proportional) difference between the deviant frequency and the
standard frequency. The effects of these factors are usually
summarized in terms of changes in the MMN peak amplitude and
its latency (see Table 1). While increasing the deviance magnitude
makes the MMN peak earlier and with a larger amplitude [4,6,7],
decreasing deviant probability only increases the MMN peak
amplitude [8] but does not change its latency [9].
The question as to which neurophysiological mechanisms
generate the MMN remains controversial (cf. [10] vs. [11]), even
though this issue has been addressed by a large number of studies
over the last thirty years [12]. One reason for an enduring
controversy could be that the MMN’s latency and amplitude
contain insufficient information to disambiguate between compet-
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ing hypotheses (but see [13]). While the MMN is the sum of
overlapping subcomponents that are generated in temporal and
frontal brain areas [12,14] – and are differentially affected by
experimental manipulations [15] – it is a continuous function of
time. This means that the underlying ERP waveforms may contain
valuable information about MMN subcomponents, the physiolog-
ical mechanisms that generate them and, critically, their functional
correlates (see e.g. [16]). Predictive coding offers a unique and
unified explanation of the MMN’s neurophysiological features. In
brief, predictive coding is a computational mechanism that
formally links perception and learning processes to neural activity
and synaptic plasticity, respectively [17]. More precisely, event-
related electrophysiological responses are thought to arise from the
brain’s attempt to minimize prediction errors (i.e. differences
between actual and predicted sensory input) through hierarchical
Bayesian inference. In this context, the MMN simply reflects
neuronal activity reporting these prediction errors in hierarchically
organized network of auditory cortical sources. If this is true, then
the rise and fall of the MMN may reflect the appearance of a
discrepancy between sensory input and top-down predictions –
and its resolution through perceptual inference. These ideas have
been used to interpret the results of experimental studies of the
MMN [8,18] and computational treatments of trial-wise changes
in amplitude [6]. However, no attempt has been made to
quantitatively relate predictive coding models to empirical
MMN waveforms. Here, we extend these efforts by explicitly
modelling the physiological mechanisms underlying the MMN in
terms of a computational mechanism: predictive coding. In other
words, our model is both an extension to dynamic causal models of
observed electrophysiological responses [18,19] to information
processing, and a neurophysiological view on meta-Bayesian
approaches to cognitive process [15]. We establish the face validity
of this neurocomputational model in terms of its ability to explain
the observed MMN and its dependence on deviant frequency and
deviance magnitude.
This paper comprises two sections. In the first section, we
summarize mathematical models of predictive coding (as derived
from the free energy principle), and describe the particular
perceptual model that we assume the brain uses in the context of a
predictable stream of auditory stimuli. The resulting scheme
provides a model of neuronal responses in auditory oddball
paradigms. In line with the DCM framework, we then augment
this model with a mapping from (hidden) neuronal dynamics to
(observed) scalp electrophysiological data. In the second section,
we use empirical ERPs acquired during an oddball paradigm to
tune the parameters of the observation model. Equipped with
these parameters, we then simulate MMN waveforms under
different levels of deviant probability and deviance magnitude –
and compare the resulting latency and amplitude changes with
findings reported in the literature. This serves to provide a proof of
principle that dynamic causal models can have a computational
form – and establish the face validity of predictive coding theories
brain function.
Models
To simulate the MMN under the predictive coding hypothesis,
we simulated the processing of standard and deviant stimuli using
established Bayesian filtering (or predictive coding) – under a
hierarchical dynamic model of repeated stimuli. This generates
time-continuous trajectories, encoding beliefs (posterior expecta-
tions and predictions) and prediction errors. These prediction
errors were then used to explain the MMN, via a forward model of
the mapping between neuronal representations of prediction error
and observed scalp potentials. In this section, we describe the steps
entailed by this sort of modelling. See Figure 1 for an overview.
Predictive coding and hierarchical dynamic models
Perception estimates the causes (v) of the sensory inputs (y) that
the brain receives. In other words, to recognise causal structure in
the world, the brain has to invert the process by which its sensory
consequences are generated from causes in the environment. This
view of perception as unconscious inference was introduced by
Helmholtz [2] in the 19th century. More recently, it has been
formalized as the inversion of a generative model m of sensory
inputs y [20]. In the language of probability theory, this means that
the percept corresponds to the posterior belief p(v,xDy,m) about the
putative causes v of sensory input y and any hidden states x that
mediate their effect. This means that any perceptual experience
depends on the model m of how sensory input is generated. To
capture the rich structure of natural sounds, the model m has to be
dynamic, hierarchical, and nonlinear. Hierarchical dynamic models
(HDMs) [21] accommodate these attributes and can be used to
model sounds as complex as birdsong [22].
HDMs generate time-continuous data y(t) as noisy observations
of a nonlinear transformation g1 of hidden states x
(1) and hidden
causes v(1):
y~v(0)~g1 x
1ð Þ,v 1ð Þ; h
 
zz 1ð Þ, ð1Þ
where the temporal evolution of hidden states x(1) is given by the
differential equation:
Table 1. Overview of the Phenomenological Properties of the
MMN.
Effect of Q on R |MMN Amplitude| MMN Latency
Higher Deviance Magnitude 8 [9] 9[11]
Lower Deviant Probability 8 [9] no effect [9]
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003288.t001
Author Summary
Computational neuroimaging enables quantitative infer-
ences from non-invasive measures of brain activity on the
underlying mechanisms. Ultimately, we would like to
understand these mechanisms not only in terms of
physiology but also in terms of computation. So far, this
has not been addressed by mathematical models of
neuroimaging data (e.g., dynamic causal models), which
have rather focused on ever more detailed inferences
about physiology. Here we present the first instance of a
dynamic causal model that explains electrophysiological
data in terms of computation rather than physiology.
Concretely, we predict the mismatch negativity – an event-
related potential elicited by regularity violation – from the
dynamics of perceptual inference as prescribed by the free
energy principle. The resulting model explains the wave-
form of the mismatch negativity and some of its
phenomenological properties at a level of precision that
has not been attempted before. This highlights the
potential of neurocomputational dynamic causal models
to enable inferences from neuroimaging data on neuro-
computational mechanisms.
Modelling the MMN Waveform
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Figure 1. Flow Chart of MMN simulations. Sensory input was generated from a Hierarchical Dynamic Model (true HDM) for a standard or deviant
stimulus. This stimulus was produced by inputs controlling the temporal evolution of loudness and frequency (hidden causes). We simulated
perception with the inversion of the internal model (internal HDM) of a subject – who anticipates the standard event with a certain degree of
confidence (prior beliefs) – with Generalised Filtering (GF). This produces a simulated trajectory of the prediction errors that are minimised during
perceptual inference. These prediction errors were weighted by their precisions and used to predict event related potentials. Model parameters are
listed on the left and model equations are provided on the right. To map prediction errors to empirical responses, they were shifted and scaled so
that the simulated stimulus duration was 70 ms. A sigmoid function was applied to model nonlinearities in the relationship between prediction error
and equivalent current dipole activity. Third, the scalp potential at the simulated electrode location was modelled as a linear superposition of the
ensuing local field potentials. Finally, the simulated EEG data was down-sampled and sheltered.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003288.g001
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_x(1)~f1 x
1ð Þ,v 1ð Þ; h
 
zw(1): ð2Þ
This equation models the change in x(1) as a nonlinear function f1
of the hidden states x(1) and hidden causes v(1) plus state noise w(1).
The hidden causes v(1) of the change in x(1) are modelled as the
outputs of a hidden process at the second level. This second
process is modelled in the same way as the hidden process at the
first level, but with new nonlinear functions f2 and g2:
v(1)~g2 x
2ð Þ,v 2ð Þ; h
 
zz(2)
_x 2ð Þ~f2 x 2ð Þ,v 2ð Þ; h
 
zw(2):
ð3Þ
As in the first level, the hidden dynamics of the second level are
driven by hidden causes v(2) that are modelled as the output of a
hidden process at the next higher level, and so forth. This
composition can be repeated as often as necessary to model the
system under consideration – up to the last level, whose input is
usually modelled as a known function of time plus noise:
v(n)~gzz(nz1): ð4Þ
The (Bayesian) inversion of HDMs is a difficult issue, which calls
for appropriate approximation schemes. To explain how the brain
is nevertheless able to recognise the causes of natural sounds, we
assume that it performs approximate Bayesian inference by minimising
variational free energy [23]. More generally, the free-energy
principle is a mathematical framework for modelling how
organisms perceive, learn, and make decisions in a parsimonious
and biologically plausible fashion. In brief, it assumes that
biological systems like the brain solve complex inference problems
by adopting a parametric approximation q(v,xDm) to a posterior
belief over hidden causes and states p(v,xDy,m). It then optimises
this approximation by minimizing the variational free-energy:
F qð Þ~{Sln p(y,v,xDm)TqzSln q(y,v,x)Tq: ð5Þ
One can think of this free-energy as an information theoretic
measure of the discrepancy between the brain’s approximate belief
about the causes of sensory input and the true posterior density.
According to the free-energy principle, cognitive processes and
their neurophysiological mechanisms serve to minimize free-
energy [24] – generally by a gradient descent with respect to the
sufficient statistics m of the brain’s approximate posterior q [5]:
_m~{
LF
Lm
: ð6Þ
This idea that the brain implements perceptual inference by free-
energy minimization is supported by a substantial amount of
anatomical, physiological, and neuroimaging evidence [4]. Algo-
rithms that invert HDMs by minimizing free-energy, such as
dynamic expectation maximization [25,26] and generalized
filtering (GF) [4,5,23,27,28], are therefore attractive candidates
for simulating and understanding perceptual inference in the
brain.
Importantly, algorithmic implementations of this gradient
descent are formally equivalent to predictive coding schemes. In
brief, representations (sufficient statistics encoding approximate
posterior expectations) generate top-down predictions to produce
prediction errors. These prediction errors are then passed up the
hierarchy in the reverse direction, to update posterior expecta-
tions. This ensures an accurate prediction of sensory input and all
its intermediate representations. This hierarchal message passing
can be expressed mathematically as a gradient descent on the (sum
of squared) prediction errors ~e(i) which are weighted by their
precisions (inverse variances) P(i):
_~m
ið Þ
v ~{L~vF~D~m ið Þv {L~v~e ið Þ:j ið Þ{j iz1ð Þv
_~m
ið Þ
x ~{L~xF~D~m ið Þx {L~x~e ið Þ:j ið Þ
j ið Þv ~P
ið Þ
v ~e
ið Þ
v ~P
ið Þ
v ~m
i{1ð Þ
v {gi ~m
ið Þ
x ,~m
ið Þ
v
  
j ið Þx ~P
ið Þ
x ~e
ið Þ
x ~P
ið Þ
x D~m i{1ð Þx {fi ~m ið Þx ,~m ið Þv
  
ð6bÞ
where ~e(i) are prediction errors and P(i) are their precisions
(inverse variances). Here and below, the , notation denotes
generalised variables (state, velocity, acceleration and so on). The
first pair of equalities just says that posterior expectations about
hidden causes and states (~m(i)v ,~m
(i)
x ) change according to a mixture
of prior prediction– the first term – and an update term in the
direction of the gradient of (precision-weighted) prediction
error. The second pair of equations expresses precision weighted
prediction error (j(i)v ,j
(i)
x ) as the difference between posterior
expectations about hidden causes and (the changes in) hidden
states and their predicted values (e(i)v ,e
(i)
x ), weighed by their
precisions (P(i)v ,P
(i)
x ). The predictions are nonlinear functions of
expectations at each level of the hierarchy and the level above.
In what follows, this predictive coding formulation will serve to
simulate perceptual recognition. We will then use prediction
errors as a proxy for neuronal activity producing ERPs. To
simulate neuronal processing using Equation 6, we need to
specify the form of the functions (gi,fi) that constitute the
generative model:
The generative (auditory) model
To model auditory cortical responses, we assume that cortical
sources embody a hierarchical model of repeated stimuli. In other
words, the hierarchical structure of the auditory cortex recapitu-
lates the hierarchical structure of sound generation (cf. [25]). This
hierarchical structure was modelled using the HDM illustrated in
Figure 2. Note that this model was used to both generate stimuli
and simulate predictive coding – assuming the brain is using the
same model. The model’s sensory prediction y(t)~v(0) took the
form of a vector of loudness modulated frequency channels
(spectrogram) at the lowest level. The level above models temporal
fluctuations in instantaneous loudness (x
(1)
1 ,x
(1)
2 ) and frequency
(x
(1)
3 ). The hidden causes v
(1)
1 and v
(1)
2 of these fluctuations are
produced by the highest level. These three levels of representation
can be mapped onto three hierarchically organized areas of
auditory cortex: primary auditory cortex (A1), lateral Heschl’s
gyrus, and inferior frontal gyrus.
A1 and lateral Heschl’s gyrus contain neuronal units encoding
posterior expectations and prediction errors, respectively. The
activity of the expectation units encodes the time course of y for
A1 and expectations about hidden states x(1) for Heschl’s gyrus.
Error units encode prediction error, i.e. the difference between
posterior expectations and top-down predictions. Top-down
connections therefore convey predictions, whereas bottom-up
connections convey prediction errors. The hidden causes are the
Modelling the MMN Waveform
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expectations of v(1), providing top-down projections from units in
inferior frontal gyrus.
Our model respects the tonotopic organization of primary
auditory cortex (see e.g. [26]) by considering 50 frequency
channels y1,    ,y50. It also captures the fact that, while most
neurons in A1 have a preferred frequency, their response also
increases with loudness [29–31]. Specifically, we assume that the
activity yi of neurons selective for frequency vi is given by:
yi~g1,i x
1ð Þ,v 1ð Þ; h
 
zz
1ð Þ
i
g1,i x
1ð Þ,v 1ð Þ; h
 
~
x
1ð Þ2
1 zx
1ð Þ2
2ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
2ps2
p exp {12s2 x 1ð Þ3 {vi 2
  ð7Þ
We can rewrite this equation in terms of the loudness L and a
tuning function w that measures how close the log-frequency x
(1)
3 is
to the neuron’s preferred log-frequency vi:
y~L:q x(1)3 {vi
 
=s
 
zz(1)
with
L~x
(1)
1
2zx
(1)
2
2
q(x)~1
 ffiffiffiffiffi
2p
p :exp {x22 
8<
: :
ð8Þ
This is our (perceptual) model of how the frequency and
loudness is encoded by frequency-selective neurons in primary
auditory cortex. We use it to simulate the activity of A1
neurons.
Note that a neuronal representation of x
(1)
3 depends only on
frequency. In the brain, frequency representations that are
invariant to the sound level (and other sound attributes) are found
in higher auditory areas; for instance in marmoset auditory cortex
[32]. Neuroimaging in humans suggests that periodicity is
represented in lateral Heschl’s gyrus and planum temporale
[33], and LFP recordings from patients again implicate lateral
Heschl’s gyrus [34]. We therefore assume that x
(1)
3 is represented
in lateral Heschl’s gyrus. The dynamics of the instantaneous
frequency x
(1)
3 is given by
t3 _x
(1)
3 ~ v
(1)
2 {x
(1)
3
 
zw
(1)
3 : ð9Þ
This equation says that the instantaneous frequency converges
towards the current target frequency v
(1)
2 at a rate of 1=t3. In the
context of communication, one can think of the target frequency
as the frequency that an agent intends to generate, where the
instantaneous frequency x
(t)
3 is the frequency that is currently
being produced. The motivation for this is that deviations from the
target frequency will be corrected dynamically over time. The
agent’s belief about v
(1)
2 reflects its expectation about the frequency
of the perceived tone and its subjective certainty or confidence
Figure 2. Hierarchical dynamical model of stimulus generation. This figure shows the form of the hierarchical dynamic model used to
generate and subsequently recognise stimuli. The sensory input (y)is modelled as a vector of amplitude-modulated frequency channels y1 whose
values are nonlinear functions of the hidden states x(1) plus observation noise. The hidden states represent the instantaneous loudness (x(1)1 and x
(1)
2 )
and frequency (x(1)3 ). The temporal evolution of these hidden states is determined by a nonlinear random differential equation that is driven by
hidden causes (v(1)). The mean of the subject’s belief (posterior expectation) about hidden causes and states is denoted by m. The tilde denotes
variables in generalised coordinates of motion.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003288.g002
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about that expectation. Therefore, the effect of the deviant
probability – in an oddball paradigm – can be modelled via the
precision of this prior belief.
The temporal evolution of the hidden states x
(1)
1 and x
(1)
2
(encoding loudness) was modelled with the following linear
dynamical system:
t1: _x
(1)
1
t2: _x
(1)
2
 !
~
{1 4
{2 {1
 
: x
(1)
1
x
(1)
2
 !
z
v
(1)
1
0
 !
z
w
(1)
1
w
(1)
2
 !
: ð10Þ
In this equation the first hidden cause v
(1)
1 drives the drives the
dynamics of hidden states, which spiral (decay) towards zero in its
absence. Finally, our model makes the realistic assumption that the
stochastic perturbations are smooth functions of time. This is
achieved by assuming that the derivatives of the stochastic
perturbations are drawn from a multivariate Gaussian with zero
mean:
~z(i)~(z(i), _z(i),€z(i),    )*N(0,~S(i)z )
~w(i)~(w(i), _w(i),€w(i),    )*N(0,~S(i)w )
ð11Þ
The parameters of this model were chosen according to the
biological and psychological considerations explained in Supple-
mentary Text S1.
Modelling perception
Having posited the relevant part of the generative model
embodied by auditory cortex, one can now proceed to its inversion
by the Bayesian generalized filtering scheme described in Equation
6. This is the focus of the next section, which recapitulates how
auditory cortex might perceive sound frequency and amplitude
using predictive coding mechanisms, given the above hierarchal
dynamic model.
Perception as model inversion by generalised
filtering. Generalised filtering or predictive coding (Equation
6) provides a process model of how auditory cortex might invert
the model above, yielding posterior estimates of (hidden) sensory
causes x,vð Þ from their noisy consequences y. Generalised filtering
(GF) [35,36] is a computationally efficient scheme for variational
Bayesian inference on hierarchical dynamical systems. This makes
it a likely candidate mechanism for typical recognition problems
that the brain solves when perceiving stimulus sequences.
Generalised filtering effectively updates posterior expectations
by accumulating evidence over time. Since it is well known that
neuronal population activity integrates inputs in a similar way
[37], we take generalised filtering as a model of neuronal evidence
accumulation or predictive coding (cf. [26]). The neuronal
implementation of this filtering is based on the anatomy of
cortical microcircuits and rests on the interaction between error
units and expectation units implicit in Equation 6. Irrespective of
the neuronal details of the implementation, prediction error units
are likely to play a key role, because (precision weighted)
prediction errors determine the free-energy gradients that update
posterior beliefs about hidden states. It has been argued that
prediction error units correspond to pyramidal neurons in the
superficial layers of cortex [38]. Since these neurons are the
primary source of local field potentials (LFP) and EEG signals, the
time course of prediction errors can – in principle – be used to
model event related potentials such as the MMN.
Modelling expectations and perception in MMN
experiments. To simulate how MMN features (such as
amplitude and latency) depend upon deviant probability and
magnitude, we assumed that the subject has heard a sequence of
standard stimuli (presented at regular intervals) and therefore
expects the next stimulus to be a standard. Under Gaussian
assumptions this prior belief is fully characterized by its mean – the
expected attributes of the anticipated stimulus – and precision
(inverse variance). The precision determines the subject’s certainty
about the sound it expects to hear; in other words, the subjective
probability that the stimulus will have the attributes of a standard.
This means one can use the expected precision to model the effect
of the deviant probability in oddball paradigms – as well as the
effects of the number of preceding standards. The effect of
deviance magnitude was simulated by varying the difference
between the expected and observed frequency. Sensory inputs to
A1 were spectrograms generated by sampling from the hierarchi-
cal dynamic model described in the previous section (Figure 2).
First, the hidden cause at the 2nd level, i.e. the target log-frequency
v
(1)
2 , was sampled from a normal distribution; for standards this
distribution was centred on the standard frequency and for
deviants it was centred on the standard frequency plus the
deviance magnitude. Then the sensory input (y) was generated by
integrating the HDM’s random differential equations with v
(1)
2
equal to the sampled target frequency. All simulated sensory inputs
were generated with low levels of noise, i.e. the precisions were set
to exp(32). The subject’s probabilistic expectation was modelled
by a Gaussian prior on the target log-frequency v
(1)
2 . Perception
was simulated with generalised filtering of the ensuing sensory
input. The generative model of the subject was identical to the
model used to generate the inputs, except for the prior belief about
the target frequency. The prior belief about the target frequency
models prior expectations established by the preceding events,
where the mean was set to the standard frequency – and its
precision was set according to the deviant probability of the
simulated oddball experiment: see Text S1. The noise precisions
were chosen to reflect epistemic uncertainty about the process
generating the sensory inputs: see Text S1. Note that since we are
dealing with dynamic generative models, the prior belief is not just
about the initial value, but about the entire trajectory of the target
frequency.
Figure 3 shows an example of stimulus generation and
recognition. This figure shows that the predictive coding scheme
correctly inferred the frequency of the tone. In these simulations,
the loudness of the stimulus was modulated by a Gaussian bump
function that peaks at about 70 ms and has a standard deviation of
about 30 ms. The sensory evidence is therefore only transient,
whereas prior beliefs are in place before, during, and after sensory
evidence is available. As a consequence, the inferred target
frequency drops back to the prior mean, when sensory input
ceases. Although we are now in a position to simulate neuronal
responses to standard and oddball stimuli, we still have to
complete the model of observed electromagnetic responses:
From prediction errors to ERPs
The production of the MMN from prediction errors was
modelled as a two stage process: the generation of scalp potentials
from neuronal responses and subsequent data processing (see
Figure 1). We modelled the scalp potentials (at one fronto-central
electrode) as the linear superposition of electromagnetic fields
caused by the activity of prediction error units in the three
simulated cortical sources – plus background activity. Specifically,
prediction error units in the A1 source are assumed to encode j(1)v
– the precision weighted sensory error; error units in lateral
Heschl’s gyrus were assumed to encode j(1)x – the precision
weighted errors in the motion of hidden (log-frequency and
Modelling the MMN Waveform
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amplitude) states; and prediction error units in the inferior frontal
gyrus were assumed to encode j(2)v – the precision weighted errors
in their inferred causes. The prediction errors were transformed
into event related potentials by three transformations. First, the
time axis was shifted (to accommodate conduction delays from the
ear) and scaled so that the simulated stimulus duration was 70 ms.
Second, a sigmoidal transformation was applied to capture the
presumably non-linear mapping from signed precision-weighted
prediction error to neural activity (i.e. the firing rate cannot be
negative and saturates for high prediction error) and in the
mapping from neuronal activity to equivalent current dipole
activity; these first two steps are summarized by
LFPi(t)~
1
1zexp {bi
:ji a:t{bð Þð Þ
: ð12Þ
Finally, the scalp potential P(t) is simulated with a linear
combination of the three local field potentials
LFP1(t),    ,LFP3(t) plus a constant:
P(t)~ 1 LFP1(t) LFP2(t) LFP3(t)ð Þ:
a0
a1
a2
a3
0
BBB@
1
CCCA: ð13Þ
Data processing was simulated by the application of down-
sampling to 200 Hz and a 3rd order Butterworth low-pass filtering
with a cut-off frequency of 40 Hz, cf. [6,23,28,39]. We performed
two simulations for each condition. In the first simulation the
subject expected stimulus A but was presented with stimulus B
(deviant). In the second simulation, the subject expected stimulus B
and was presented with stimulus B (standard). The MMN was
estimated by the difference wave (deviant ERP – standard ERP).
This procedure reproduces the analysis used in electrophysiology
[7,40].
This completes the specification of our computationally
informed dynamic causal model of the MMN.
To explore the predictions of this model under different levels of
deviant probability and magnitude, we first estimated the
biophysical parameters (i.e. the slope parameters b in (12) and
the lead field a in (13)) from the empirical ERPs described in [19],
using standard nonlinear least-squares techniques (i.e. the
GlobalSearch algorithm [41] from the Matlab Global Optimiza-
tion toolbox). We then used the estimated parameters to predict
the MMN under different combinations of deviant probability and
magnitude.
In particular, the simulated MMN waveforms were used to
reproduce the descriptive statistics typically reported in MMN
experiments, i.e. MMN amplitude and latency. MMN latency was
estimated by the fractional area technique [19], because it is
regarded as one of the most robust methods for measuring ERP
latencies [42]. Specifically, we estimated the MMN latency as the
time point at which 50% of the area of the MMN trough lies on
either side. This analysis was performed on the difference wave
between the first and last point at which the amplitude was at least
half the MMN amplitude. This analysis was performed on the
unfiltered MMN waveforms as recommended by [43]. MMN
amplitude was estimated by the average voltage of the low-pass
filtered MMN difference wave within a 610 ms window around
the estimated latency.
Results
Simulated ERPs
Figure 4 shows that the waveforms generated by our model
reproduce the characteristic shape of the MMN, the positivity
evoked by the standard and the negativity evoked by the deviant.
The latency of the simulated MMN (164 ms) was almost identical
Figure 3. Simulation of perceptual inference. This figure shows the simulated time course of the perceived frequency for four different
deviants. The expected frequency was 1000Hz and the frequency of the simulated deviant varied between 1020Hz and 1320Hz. The simulated
auditory responses correctly inferred the deviant frequency, despite its discrepancy with its prior expectation. The prior certainty was chosen to
correspond to a deviant probability of 0.05.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003288.g003
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to the latency of the empirical MMN (166 ms). Its peak amplitude
(22.71 mV) was slightly higher than for the empirically measured
MMN ({3:3mV), and its width at half-maximum amplitude
(106 ms) was also very similar to the width of the empirical MMN
waveform (96 ms). In short, having optimised the parameters
mapping from the simulated neuronal activity to empirically
observed responses, we were able to reproduce empirical MMNs
remarkably accurately. This is nontrivial because the underlying
neuronal dynamics are effectively solving a very difficult Bayesian
model inversion or filtering problem. Using these optimised
parameters, we proceeded to quantify how the MMN waveform
would change with deviance magnitude and probability.
To simulate the effect of deviant probability, we simulated the
responses to a deviant under different degrees of prior certainty.
To simulate the effect of deviance magnitude, we varied the
discrepancy between the expected and observed frequency, while
keeping the deviant probability constant. Finally, we investigated
potential interactions between deviance magnitude and deviant
probability by simulating the effect of magnitude under different
prior certainties and vice versa.
Qualitative comparisons to empirical data. To establish
the model’s face validity, we asked whether it could replicate the
empirically established qualitative effects of deviant probability
and magnitude summarized in Table 1. Figure 5a shows the
simulated effects of deviance magnitude on the MMN for a
deviant probability of 0.05. As the deviance magnitude increases
from 2% to 32% the MMN trough deepens. Interestingly, this
deepening is not uniform across peristimulus time, but it is more
pronounced at the beginning. In effect, the shape of the MMN
changes, such that an early peak emerges and the MMN latency
decreases. The effects of deviance magnitude on MMN peak
amplitude and latency hold irrespective of the deviant probability:
see Figure 6. In short, our model correctly predicts the empirical
effects of deviance magnitude on MMN amplitude and latency
(Table 1).
Figure 5b shows the effect of deviant probability on the MMN
for a deviance magnitude of 12.7%. As the probability of a deviant
decreases, the MMN trough deepens, but its shape and centre
remain unchanged. As with empirical findings (Table 1), our
simulations suggest that the amplitude of the MMN’s peak
increases with decreasing deviant probability, but its latency is
unaffected. Figure 6 summarizes the peak amplitudes and latencies
of the simulated MMN as a function of deviance magnitude and
probability. As the upper plot shows, the MMN peak amplitude
increases with deviance magnitude and decreases with deviant
probability. Furthermore, deviance magnitude appears to amplify
the effect of deviant probability and vice versa. The lower plot
shows that the MMN latency is shorter when deviance magnitude
is 32% than when it is 12.7%. These results also suggest that the
deviant probability has no systematic effect on MMN latency – if
Figure 4. Simulated ERPs vs. empirical ERPs. This figure compares the simulated ERPs evoked by the standard and the deviant, and their
difference – the MMN – to the empirical ERPs from [70,71] to which the model was fitted. The simulation captures both the positivity evoked by the
standard and the negativity evoked by the deviant.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003288.g004
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the deviance magnitude is at most 12.7% and deviant probability
is below 40%. However, they predict that MMN latency shortens
with decreasing deviant probability – if deviance magnitude is
increased to 32% or deviant probability is increased to 40%.
Furthermore, our model predicts that MMN amplitude is
higher when the deviant is embedded in a stream of standards
(deviant condition) than when the same tone is embedded in a
random sequence of equiprobable tones (control condition)
[44,45]: In the control condition – with its equiprobable tones –
the trial-wise prediction about the target frequency is necessarily
less precise. As a result, the neural activity encoding the precision
weighted prediction error about the target frequency will be lower,
so that the deviant negativity will be reduced relative to the
deviant condition. This phenomenon cannot be explained by the
Figure 5. Simulated effects of deviance magnitude and deviant probability. This figure shows the simulated effect of deviance magnitude
(panel A) and deviant probability (panel B) on the MMN waveform. As the deviance magnitude increases, the trough becomes deeper and wider and
an early peak emerges (panel A). As deviant probability is decreased, the depth of the MMN’s trough increases, whereas its latency does not change
(panel B). In panel A, the standard frequency was 1000 Hz, the corresponding deviance frequencies were 1020 Hz, 1040 Hz, 1270 Hz, and 1320 Hz,
and the simulated deviant probability was 0.05. In panel B, the deviance magnitude was 12.7% (standard: 1000 Hz, deviant 1270 Hz).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003288.g005
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spike-frequency adaptation in narrow frequency channels [44], but
see [46-50] for a demonstration that it can be explained by
synaptic depression.
Quantitative comparisons to empirical data. Having
established that the model reproduces the effects of deviant
probability and magnitude on MMN amplitude and latency in a
qualitative sense, we went one step further and assessed
quantitative predictions. For this purpose, we simulated three
MMN experiments and reproduced the analyses reported in the
corresponding empirical studies. We found that the effects of
deviance magnitude and probability on the MMN peak amplitude
matched the empirical data of [51] and [52] not only qualitatively
but also quantitatively (see Figure 7a). Our model explained
93.6% of the variance due to deviance magnitude reported in [9]
(r~0:97,p~0:0015,n~6) and 93.2% of the variance due to
deviant probability reported in [10] (r~0:9658,pv10{7,n~14).
Furthermore, we simulated two experiments that investigated how
the MMN latency depends on deviance magnitude [9] and
probability [10] (see Figure 7b). The model correctly predicted the
absence of an effect of deviant probability on MMN latency in a
study where the deviance magnitude was 20% [9]. While our
model predicted that the MMN latency is shorter for high
deviance magnitudes than for low deviance magnitudes, it also
predicted a sharp transition between long MMN latencies
(195 ms) for deviance magnitudes up to 12.7% and a substantially
shorter MMN latency (125 ms) for a deviance magnitude of 32%.
By contrast, the results reported in [11] appear to suggest a
gradual transition between long and short MMN latencies. In
effect, the model’s predictions explained only 51.9% of the
variance of MMN latency as a function of deviance magnitude
[11] (r~0:7204,p~0:1064,n~6).
Discussion
We have described a process model of the MMN and its
dependence on deviant stimulus (deviance magnitude) and context
(deviant probability). Together with the study presented in [9], this
work demonstrates the potential of predictive coding to provide a
comprehensive explanation of MMN phenomenology. More
precisely, our model explains the effects of deviant probability
and magnitude on the MMN amplitude under the assumption that
evoked responses reflect the neuronal encoding of (precision
weighted) prediction errors. The simulated MMN was a superpo-
sition of the electrical fields generated by prediction errors at
different hierarchical levels of representation (see Figure 2), where
their relative contributions (i.e. the coefficients in equation (13))
differed: the errors in the predictions at the highest level of
representation (inferior frontal gyrus) were weighted most strongly,
followed by prediction error at the sensory level (A1) and
prediction errors at the intermediate level (lateral Heschl’s gyrus).
As a result, the simulated MMN primarily reflected prediction
errors on the hidden causes (attributes), rather than prediction
errors on their physical features.
Our model offers a simple explanation as to why the MMN
amplitude decreases with deviant probability and increases with
deviance magnitude. Precision weighted prediction errors are the
product of a prediction error and the precision of the top-down
prediction. Hence, according to our model, deviance magnitude
increases MMN amplitude, because it increases prediction errors.
Similarly decreasing the probability of the deviant increases the
MMN amplitude by increasing the precision of (learned) top-down
predictions. Furthermore, since precision and prediction error
interact multiplicatively, the precision determines the gain of the
effect of prediction error and vice versa.
This model explains the shortening of the MMN latency with
deviance magnitude by a selective amplification of frequency-
related prediction errors that are only transiently expressed –
because they are explained away quickly by top-down predictions.
These prediction errors increase with deviance magnitude.
However, there are also prediction errors that are not explained
away by perceptual inference. These errors are sustained
throughout the duration of the stimulus (as the stimulus amplitude
fluctuates) and do not depend on the difference between the
standard and the deviant event. Hence, according to our model,
deviance magnitude selectively increases the early prediction error
component, but not sustained errors. In effect, as deviance
magnitude increases, an early trough emerges within the MMN, so
that the MMN latency shortens (see Figure 5a and Figure 6). By
contrast, increasing the precision of high-level beliefs increases all
precision weighted frequency prediction errors – the transient and
the sustained – equally. Thus the MMN deepens uniformly, and
no early trough emerges. This is why – according to the model –
the deviant probability has no effect on the MMN latency for
moderate deviance magnitudes. However, if the deviance magni-
tude is so large that the transient component dominates the
Figure 6. Simulated MMN phenomenology. Our simulations
predict that deviance magnitude increases the MMN peak amplitude
and shortens its latency. Furthermore, our simulations suggest that
when the deviant probability is decreased, the peak amplitude
increases, while its latency does not change. The deviance magnitude
is specified relative to the standard frequency of 1000 Hz.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003288.g006
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frequency-related prediction error, the situation is different. In this
case, increasing the weight of the frequency-related prediction
errors relative to loudness-related prediction errors can shorten the
latency, because the frequency-related prediction error predom-
inates at the beginning of perception – whereas the amplitude
related prediction error is constant throughout perception. This is
why our model predicts that the MMN latency becomes
dependent on deviant probability at higher levels of deviance
magnitude.
Novel predictions
Our MMN simulations predict a nonlinear interaction between
the effects of deviant probability and magnitude. The upper plot in
Figure 6 suggests that the effect of deviant probability on MMN
peak amplitude increases with increasing deviance magnitude.
Conversely, the effect of deviance magnitude increases with
decreasing deviant probability. Furthermore, the lower plot in
Figure 6 suggests, that the effect of deviant probability on MMN
latency depends on deviance magnitude: If deviance magnitude is
at most 12.7%, the MMN latency does not depend on deviant
probability, but when deviance magnitude is as large as 32%, the
MMN latency increases with deviant probability. Conversely, the
size of the effect of deviance magnitude on MMN latency depends
on deviant probability. Hence, our simulations predict a number
of interaction effects that can be tested empirically.
Relation to previous work
Although the physiological mechanisms generating the MMN
have been modelled previously [9], the model presented here is the
first to bridge the gap between the computations implicit in
perceptual inference and the neurophysiology of ERP waveforms.
In terms of Marr’s levels of analysis [53], our model provides an
explanation at both the algorithmic and implementational levels of
analysis – and represents a step towards full meta-Bayesian
inference – namely inferring from measurements of brain activity
on how the brain computes (cf. [13,19,51–55]).
Figure 7. Quantitative model fit of MMN amplitude and latency. This figure compares predictions about the MMN amplitude (panel A) and
latency (panel B) with empirical data from auditory oddball experiments. The upper plot in panel A is based on [72], where deviance magnitude was
varied for a fixed deviant probability of 0.05. The lower plot in panel A is based on [19], where deviant probability was varied for a fixed deviance
magnitude of 15% (deviant frequency: 1150 Hz, standard frequency: 1000 Hz). The upper plot in panel B is based on the same experiment [9] as the
upper plot in panel A. The lower plot in panel B is based on [10], where deviant probability was varied with a fixed deviance magnitude of 20%
(deviant frequency 1200 Hz, standard frequency 1000 Hz). The error bars indicate the standard error of the mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003288.g007
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Our model builds upon the proposal that the brain inverts
hierarchical dynamic models of its sensory inputs by minimizing
free-energy in a hierarchy of predictive coding circuits [56].
Specifically, we asked whether the computational principles
proposed in [15,20] are sufficient to generate realistic MMN
waveforms and account for their dependence on deviant
probability and deviance magnitude. In doing so, we have
provided a more realistic account of the algorithmic nature of
the brain’s implementation of these computational principles:
While previous simulations have explored the dynamics of
perceptual inference prescribed by the free-energy principle using
dynamic expectation maximization (DEM) [23,39], the simula-
tions presented here are based on GF [23,39]. Arguably, GF
provides a more realistic model of learning and inference in the
brain than DEM, because it is an online algorithm that can be run
in real-time to simultaneously infer hidden states and learn the
model; i.e., as sensory inputs arrive. In contrast to DEM it does not
have to iterate between inferring hidden states, learning param-
eters, and learning hyperparameters. This is possible, because GF
dispenses the mean-field assumption made by DEM. Another
difference to previous work is that we have modelled the neural
representation of precision weighted prediction error by sigmoidal
activation functions, whereas previous simulations ignored poten-
tial nonlinear effects by assuming that the activity of prediction
error units is a linear function of precision weighted prediction
error [6,24,27,39]. Most importantly, the model presented here
connects the theory of free-energy minimisation and predictive
coding to empirical measurements of the MMN in human
subjects.
To our knowledge, our model is the first to provide a
computational explanation of the MMN’s dependence on
deviance magnitude, deviant probability, and their interaction.
While [26] modelled the effect of deviance magnitude, they did
not consider the effect of deviant probability. Although [6,24]
modelled the effect of deviant probability, they did not simulate
the effect of deviance magnitude, nor did they make quantitative
predictions of MMN latency or amplitude. Mill et al. [13,55]
simulated the effects of deviance magnitude and deviant
probability on the firing rate of single auditory neurons in
anaesthetized rats. While their simulations captured the
qualitative effects of deviance magnitude and deviant probabil-
ity on response amplitude, they did not capture the shortening
of the MMN latency with decreasing deviant probability. By
contrast, our model generates realistic MMN waveforms and
explains the qualitative effects of deviant probability and
magnitude on the amplitude and latency of the MMN. Beyond
this, our model makes remarkably accurate quantitative
predictions of the MMN amplitude across two experiments
[53] examining several combinations of deviance magnitude
and deviant probability.
Limitations
The simulations reported in this paper demonstrate that
predictive coding can explain the MMN and certain aspects of
its dependence on the deviant stimulus and its context.
However, they do not imply that the assumptions of predictive
coding are necessary to explain the MMN. Instead, the
simulations are a proof-of-concept that it is possible to relate
the MMN to a process model of how prediction errors are
encoded dynamically by superficial pyramidal cells during
perceptual inference. For parsimony, our model includes only
those three intermediate levels of the auditory hierarchy that are
assumed to be the primary sources of the MMN. In particular,
we do not model the subcortical levels of the auditory system.
However, our model does not assume that predictive coding
starts in primary auditory cortex. To the contrary, the input to
A1 is assumed to be the prediction error from auditory
thalamus. This is consistent with the recent discovery of
subcortical precursors of the MMN [52]. Since MMN wave-
forms were simulated using the parameters estimated from the
average ERPs reported in [9,10], the waveforms shown in
Figure 4 are merely a demonstration that our model can fit
empirical data. However, the model’s ability to predict how the
MMN waveform changes as a function of deviance magnitude
and deviant probability speaks to its face validity.
Our model’s most severe failure was that while our model
correctly predicted that MMN latency shortens with deviance
magnitude, it failed to predict that this shortening occurs gradually
for deviance magnitudes between 2.5% and 7.5%. In principle,
the model predicts that the latency shortens gradually within a
certain range of deviance magnitudes, but this range did not
coincide with the one observed empirically.
There are clearly many explanations for this failure – for
example, an inappropriate generative model or incorrect forms for
the mapping between prediction errors and local field potentials.
Perhaps the more important point here is that these failures
generally represent opportunities. This is because one can revise or
extend the model and compare the evidence for an alternative
model with the evidence for the original model using Bayesian
model comparison of dynamic causal models in the usual way [57–
59]. Indeed, this is one of the primary motivations for developing
dynamic causal models that are computationally informed or
constrained. In other words, one can test competing hypotheses or
models about both the computational (and biophysical) processes
underlying observed brain responses.
Conclusions
This work is a proof-of-principle that important aspects of evoked
responses in general – and the MMN in particular – can be
explained by formal (Bayesian) models of the predictive coding
mechanism [19]. Our model explains the dynamics of the MMN in
continuous time and some of its phenomenology at a precision level
that has not been attempted before. By placing normative models of
computation within the framework of dynamic causal models one
has the opportunity to use Bayesian model comparison to adjudicate
between competing computational theories. Future studies might
compare predictive coding to competing accounts such as the fresh-
afferent theory [60–62]. In addition, the approach presented here
could be extended to a range of potentials evoked by sensory stimuli,
including the N1 and the P300, in order to generalise the
explanatory scope of predictive coding or free energy formulations.
This sort of modelling approach might be used to infer how
perceptual inference changes with learning, attention, and context.
This is an attractive prospect, given that the MMN is elicited not only
in simple oddball paradigms, but also in more complex paradigms
involving the processing of speech, language, music, and abstract
features [7,53,63]. Furthermore, a computational anatomy of the
MMN might be useful for probing disturbances of perceptual
inference and learning in psychiatric conditions, such as schizophre-
nia [13,55]. Similarly, extensions of this model could also be used to
better understand the effects of drugs, such as ketamine [12,64–66],
or neuromodulators, such as acetylcholine [67–69], on the MMN.
We hope to pursue this avenue of research in future work.
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